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RELIGION AND RACE: THE MINISTERIAL
EXCEPTION REEXAMINED
Ian Bartrum*
The ministerial exception has, at long last, arrived before the Supreme
Court.
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Justices will finally consider the
controversial doctrine that shields religious organizations from
antidiscrimination suits brought by ministerial employees. 1 In part because
the exception guards a highly contested border between two fundamental
constitutional values—equal protection and religious liberty—it has been
the subject of significant discord among circuit courts. Although lower
federal courts have recognized and applied some version of the ministerial
exception for almost forty years, they have diverged widely on its proper
scope and substance. 2 That is, courts have agreed neither on which jobs
count as ―ministerial,‖ nor on the kinds of claims from which religious
employers are ―excepted.‖3 As this colloquy‘s other contributors make
clear, Hosanna-Tabor seems better positioned to settle the former question
than the latter.4 Nonetheless, I think the case‘s appearance on the Court‘s
docket gives us occasion to revisit other controverted aspects of the
ministerial exception, and that is my intention here.
In this Essay, I acknowledge that the ministerial exception serves
important constitutional values, but contend that those values must yield to
a newer national commitment to end racial discrimination. I argue in favor
of robust doctrinal protections for church autonomy in most ministerial
hiring decisions, but because race occupies a special and central place in
our modern constitutional consciousness, I conclude that we cannot permit
religious organizations to discriminate on that basis. I begin, however, with
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597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (link).
2
The seminal case is McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972) (link).
3
Compare Clapper v. Chesapeake Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, No. 97-2648, 1998 WL
904528, at *7 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1998) (concluding that parochial school teachers qualify as ministers),
with DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 172 (2d Cir. 1993) (concluding that such teachers
are not ministers) (link). For an excellent documentation of further divergences, see Christopher C.
Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV 101 (forthcoming 2011) (link).
4
The issue in Hosanna-Tabor revolves around whether a ―called‖ teacher at a Lutheran school
qualifies as a ―minister.‖ As such, the case will likely focus primarily on the so-called ―primary duties‖
test. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–11, Hosanna-Tabor, No.10-553 (Oct. 22, 2010) (link).
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a brief discussion of the ministerial exception and the constitutional
principles that it embodies.
I. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
The ministerial exception emerged from the federal judiciary‘s efforts
to implement Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in the early 1970s.
Congress, it seems, foresaw potential conflict between antidiscrimination
laws and religious liberty, and thus wrote an exemption for religious
employers into the statute. While the original House bill would not have
subjected such employers to Title VII at all, the final Senate version
exempted only religious preferentialism related to an employer‘s religious
mission.5 In 1972, Congress revised the law to permit an array of religious
groups—including schools and universities—to consider religion when
filling a wide variety of positions. 6 Thus, the modern statutory exemption is
broad in scope, but relatively shallow in substance. Religious employers
may discriminate when hiring for nearly all jobs, but they may do so only
on religious grounds—not on the basis of race, gender, or national origin. 7
Courts quickly concluded, however, that the statutory language did not
adequately address the full range of constitutional questions involved.
Although a narrow exemption in favor of religious preferences might be
appropriate for lower-level employees, a venerable line of Supreme Court
decisions seemed to call for greater deference to church autonomy in
constitutive decisions about governance and ministering. 8 Just two years
after the 1972 amendments, the Fifth Circuit laid out the basic contours of
the modern ministerial exception in a gender discrimination case:
We find that the application of the provisions of Title VII
to the employment relationship existing between The
Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure, a church and its
minister would result in an encroachment by the State into
an area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter
by the principles of the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment. . . . We therefore hold that Congress did not
intend, through the nonspecific wording of the applicable
provisions of Title VII, to regulate the employment
relationship between church and minister.9
5

Janet S. Belcove-Shalin, Ministerial Exception and Title VII Claims: Case Law Grid Analysis, 2
NEV. L.J. 86, 90–91 (2002).
6
Senator Sam Ervin famously claimed his namesake amendment was necessary to ―take the
political hands of Caesar off of the institutions of God . . . .‖ Id. at 91 (quoting King‘s Garden, Inc. v.
FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 55 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1964)).
7
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2006) (link).
8
See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559–60 (5th Cir. 1972) (discussing cases).
9
Id. at 560–61.
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The doctrinal exception, then, is something like the obverse of the
statutory exemption. Rather than broad and shallow, the ministerial
exception is narrow and deep: it applies to a smaller class of hiring
decisions, but it permits almost any kind of discrimination—including acts
of racial discrimination we would find constitutionally abhorrent in almost
any other context.
There are, however, several excellent justifications for the exception in
something like the form in which it now exists. These arguments are
perhaps best understood in terms of the particular constitutional language in
which they are rooted. For example, there are persuasive historical and
ethical arguments—of the kind Rick Garnett and Thomas Berg make10—
that arise primarily out of the Free Exercise Clause. There are also
compelling structural and prudential claims—what Chris Lund calls the
exception‘s ―relational‖ and ―autonomy‖ components11—based in the
Establishment Clause. 12 Of course, not all commentators accept these
arguments. Some very thoughtful people, including Caroline Mala Corbin
in this discussion, have asked tough doctrinal questions about whether the
Constitution requires courts to place religious organizations above the law,
so to speak, when they hire and fire ministerial employees. 13 I think a quick
assessment of these competing positions can help clarify important
questions the exception raises, and it will provide a nice backdrop for my
own thoughts about the difficult constitutional relationship between race
and religion.
In their amicus brief to the Court, and again in this colloquy,
Professors Garnett and Berg make the case that the ministerial exception is
a straightforward entailment of our longstanding constitutional commitment
to the institutional separation of church and state. 14 Their argument looks to
the intellectual and political history of disestablishment in Europe and the
colonies, and they conclude that the Founders were distinctly aware of the
dangers that arise when the state interferes in matters of church
governance. 15 Theirs is the history of an idea—liberty of conscience—that

10

Brief Amici Curiae of Professor Eugene Volokh et al. in Support of Petitioner at 6, Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (No. 10-533), 2011 WL
2470847 [hereinafter ―Garnett & Berg‖] (link).
11
Lund, supra note 3, at 104–05.
12
For a complete taxonomy of the modalities of constitutional argument (historical, structural,
ethical, etc.), see generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1982).
13
Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v.
EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 96 (2011) [hereinafter Corbin, Irony] (link); Caroline Mala
Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination
Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007) (link).
14
See Garnett & Berg, supra note 10, at 3.
15
See id.
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traces its lineage from Thomas Aquinas, to Martin Luther and John Calvin,
on to John Locke and the dissenting American Baptists.16 For the Founders,
this idea was almost certainly the intellectual foundation of both the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses, and institutional entanglement
between civil and religious authorities posed one of the greatest practical
threats to the abstract ideal.17 Garnett and Berg go on to argue that these
founding principles gave rise to a uniquely American tradition of
institutional separation—a constitutional ethos now reflected in a body of
doctrine known as the ―church autonomy‖ cases.18 Ultimately, they make
the historical and ethical claim, rooted primarily in the Free Exercise
Clause, that we have a fundamental constitutional commitment to shield
church governance questions from most kinds of state oversight, and it is
this commitment that the ministerial exception embodies.
Professor Lund argues that there are also important structural and
prudential reasons to keep the exception alive and strong. He identifies
three basic justifications for the ministerial exception—what he calls its
―relational,‖ ―conscience,‖ and ―autonomy‖ components.19 While Lund‘s
―conscience‖ component relies on some of the historical evidence described
above, his ―relational‖ and ―autonomy‖ components consider instead the
relationships between constitutional institutions and the practical
consequences of constitutional policy decisions. 20
His ―relational‖
justification reflects the basic nature of organized religious institutions,
which exist only inasmuch as their memberships share a core set of
religious beliefs or principles. 21 The moment that a civil authority starts to
impose external membership criteria, these organizations cease to be
―religious,‖ as the state, rather than a divine, has begun to define the terms
of their existence. Structurally, therefore, a constitutional commitment to
disestablishment requires a complete separation between church and civil
governance, and a strong ministerial exception protects this division. 22
Lund‘s ―autonomy‖ component applies these structural lessons to the
particularly acute case of ministerial appointments.23 Choices about
spiritual leadership are among the most important constitutive decisions a
church can make, and Lund identifies four kinds of prudential concerns that

16

See generally Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 346 (2002). The idea, succinctly put, is that a just government must not require its citizens to
choose between their duties to God and their duties to the state—in effect, forcing a choice between
prison and eternal damnation. Id. at 350–52.
17
See Garnett & Berg, supra note 10, at 5–6.
18
See id. at 7–8.
19
Lund, supra note 3, at 104–05.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 121–22.
22
See id. at 125–27.
23
Id. at 131–34.
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arise when the state second-guesses their choices. 24 These difficulties arise
from the array of remedies employment law may impose, which could
involve reinstatement of a dismissed minister, institutional restructuring
after a class action suit, or sustained state supervision with its concomitant
regulatory entanglements.25 Lund rightly argues that, in practice, these
remedies would pose a very serious threat to a church‘s spiritual mission.
In the interest of constitutional policy, then, it makes good sense to shield
religious organizations from the supervisory apparatus of employment
antidiscrimination laws. Combined, Lund‘s ―relational‖ and ―autonomy‖
components suggest that sound constitutional structure and prudence
require a broad and deferential ministerial exception.
On the other side of the debate, Professor Corbin makes the doctrinal
claim that neither of the two religion clauses requires the kind of broad
constitutional deference the ministerial exception extends to religious
organizations.26 As a matter of Free Exercise Clause doctrine, she argues
that, after the Court‘s decision in Employment Division v. Smith,27 neutral
and generally applicable laws—such as Title VII or the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)—need not provide exemptions when they
incidentally burden religious practice.28 As a matter of Establishment
Clause doctrine, if courts use the ―neutral principles of law‖ approach in
deciding employment cases, the only institutional entanglements likely to
arise will actually boil down to Free Exercise Clause exemption claims,
which also fail after Smith.29 That is, while a court must defer to a church‘s
interpretation of its own doctrine, the Constitution provides no relief when
this doctrine runs afoul of a neutral and generally applicable law. From this
perspective, the ministerial exception becomes wholly unnecessary because
the statutory exemptions provide religious organizations with all the
constitutional protection they deserve.
I am generally more sympathetic to Garnett, Berg, and Lund‘s
arguments than to Corbin‘s. The problem with Corbin‘s position is that, as
a doctrinal claim, it is only as strong as the doctrine on which it relies, and
Smith cannot bear the weight she asks of it. First, the case is weak as a
matter of precedent. Simply put, Smith was wrong the day it was decided.
It provoked intense public outcry at the time and remains very controversial
today.30 Corbin‘s arguments notwithstanding, I think the Court will likely
24

Id. at 134.
Id. at 135–46.
26
Corbin, Irony, supra note 13, at 98.
27
494 U.S. 872 (1990) (link).
28
Corbin, Irony, supra note 13, at 104–05.
29
Id. The ―neutral principles‖ approach, derived from the Court‘s opinion in Jones v. Wolf, asks
judges to treat all relevant evidence in a case from a neutral legal perspective, but to defer to church
authorities whenever controversies over religious doctrine arise. 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979) (link).
30
For a discussion of the reaction to Smith, see Stephen L. Carter, The Resurrection of Religious
Freedom?, 107 HARV. L. REV. 118 (1993) (link).
25

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/29/

195

106: 191 (2011)

Religion and Race

read Smith‘s holding as narrowly as possible in future decisions, and the
opinion itself provides several important caveats. 31 Second, Congress has
undermined the case‘s doctrinal value. In response to Smith, Congress
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which restored
strict scrutiny as the standard of review for state or federal laws that place
substantial burdens on religious practice.32 The Court struck down RFRA‘s
application to state laws as beyond Congress‘s authority under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 33 but the statute remains constitutional as applied
to federal laws. 34 As the Court made clear in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita
Beneficente: ―[T]he Federal Government may not, as a statutory matter,
substantially burden a person‘s exercise of religion, even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability.‖35 Title VII and the ADA are, of
course, federal laws, which means that even if Corbin is correct in asserting
that the Constitution does not require courts to recognize a ministerial
exception, it remains likely that RFRA does. 36 Thus, with its cornerstone
weakened, Corbin‘s larger doctrinal argument begins to crumble.
I still harbor serious reservations, however, about the ministerial
exception‘s application in the context of racial discrimination claims despite
my general agreement with the exception‘s supporters. There are
compelling historical, ethical, and doctrinal reasons to think that racial
discrimination presents a special constitutional case; that it in fact invokes
constitutional values that supersede the religion clauses. So, with this
generally strong ministerial exception in mind, Part II explores the troubled
constitutional confluence of religion and race.
II. RACE, RELIGION, AND CONSTITUTIONAL HIERARCHY
Unspoken racism remained a central part of the new Constitution when
the First Congress convened in 1789 to draft the Bill of Rights. Meeting
under the auspices of a document that counted ―other Persons‖ at threefifths their actual number and precluded any limit on the ―Importation of
31

For an excellent discussion of these caveats, including Smith‘s explicit preservation of the church
autonomy cases, see Lund, supra note 3, at 153–55.
32
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006) (link).
33
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (link).
34
See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006)
(link).
35
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
36
I realize that some courts, including in the Sixth Circuit whence Hosanna-Tabor arises, have held
that the RFRA does not apply in suits between private parties. Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day
Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 411 (6th Cir. 2010) (link). This dubious reasoning, however, hardly
seems apposite in employment discrimination cases, in which the EEOC often sues on behalf of private
plaintiffs. Indeed, McGill itself explicitly contemplates RFRA‘s applicability in such cases. Id.
(distinguishing copyright cases from employment cases on this basis). It is true, of course, that RFRA
does not affect Smith‘s application to state nondiscrimination laws, and Corbin‘s argument has
correspondingly greater bite in that context.
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such Persons‖ until 1808, Congress began working on a list of rights and
privileges reserved to ―Free‖ Americans.37 In this historical context, one
would hardly expect legislators to attempt to balance the newly enumerated
liberties against considerations of basic racial equality. Of course, no such
balance was struck in drafting the First Amendment, which, as Hugo Black
was fond of reminding us, presents itself in starkly absolute terms. 38 As a
result, it is very difficult to argue, as a historical or textual matter, that the
Framers or Ratifiers intended to limit the free exercise of religion to racially
nondiscriminatory practices. It is equally clear, however, that our
Constitution has changed a great deal since 1789. Indeed, the original sin
of black slavery very nearly ended the entire American endeavor before it
was one hundred years old, and there is no denying that new constitutional
values—values forged in the crucibles of war and civil disobedience—now
inform and temper our founding principles. 39 In this Part, I hope to bring
history, ethos, and doctrine together to demonstrate that the most important
of these new principles is a virtual ban on racial discrimination—a ban that
now trumps even religious liberty.
A. History
Congressional efforts to undermine the Constitution‘s racist features
began almost as soon as the Legislature convened. Indeed, on the very day
the First Congress began debate on the Religion Clauses, it reaffirmed the
Northwest Ordinance, first enacted by the Confederation Congress two
years earlier. 40 The Ordinance, which defined the relationship between
territorial settlers and the federal government, has now achieved canonical
stature in constitutional argument, and served as something of a constitution
in itself for those who settled the northwestern lands. 41 Central among the
conditions and covenants it established was a promise that the Northwest
Territory would remain free soil: ―There shall be neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment
of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.‖42 This
aspiration spoke to antislavery advocates, in the words of Akhil Amar, as ―a
much purer symbol of what America could and should be—a symbol of the
West, a symbol of the future, a symbol of hope, a symbol of free soil, free
37

U.S. CONST. art. I. § 2, cl. 3; § 9, cl. 1 (link). The vast majority of ―other‖ Americans were, of
course, of African descent.
38
See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring) (―I read ‗no
law . . . abridging‘ to mean no law abridging.‖) (link).
39
For an enlightening account of the ―reconstruction‖ the Bill of Rights underwent following the
Civil War, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
40
Act of Aug. 7, 1789, 1 Stat. 50 (link).
41
For an excellent discussion of the Ordinance‘s symbolic importance in our constitutional
imaginations, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA‘S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 448–51 (forthcoming
2012) (on file with author).
42
1 Stat. 53 (quoting the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 art. VI) (link).
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men, and freedom.‖43 While efforts to end slavery are not in themselves
efforts to end racial distinctions or discrimination, the Northwest Ordinance
is certainly historical evidence that, from the earliest days, many Americans
believed that political compromises had left something fundamental—a
basic equality principle of the highest order—out of the new Constitution.
The national debate over slavery became only more intense, of course,
and there is not enough space here to rehearse all of the political wrangling
of the next half-century. It is worth briefly considering, however, the
Supreme Court‘s bungled attempt to put an end, once and for all, to that
debate. Although Chief Justice Roger Taney‘s convoluted constitutional
syntax itself makes Dred Scott v. Sandford worth reading, the decision is
important here because Taney drew explicit links between race, citizenship,
and constitutional rights. One can conceivably read the Northwest
Ordinance in racially neutral terms—as an attack on slavery of any kind—
but it is impossible to miss the constitutional significance that Taney placed
on race in Dred Scott. By concluding that the Constitution treated blacks as
―so far inferior that they had no rights a white man was bound to respect,‖
he definitively tied the privileges of citizenship to racial identity. 44 No
longer was the distinction one between ―free‖ and ―unfree‖ persons; in
Dred Scott, once-unspoken racism emerged as a bright constitutional line.
If the aspirational equality at the heart of the Northwest Ordinance elevated
it into the constitutional canon, then Taney‘s unabashed bigotry has
certainly condemned Dred Scott to the very depths of the anticanon.
These two historical texts—one canonical, the other anticanonical—
reveal both the centrality of the race question in antebellum
constitutionalism and the decisive answer we have now settled upon.
Indeed, the first postwar amendments spoke directly to these texts. The
Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished ―slavery or involuntary servitude,‖
self-consciously echoes the language of the Northwest Ordinance‘s central
covenant, thus elevating the territorial aspiration to a fundamental national
commitment.45 Moreover, the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment plainly reveals an intention to repudiate Dred Scott. 46
Accordingly, the Amendment‘s final language flatly rejects Taney‘s effort
to link citizenship with race, and it goes on to guarantee all ―persons‖—
even noncitizens—the ―equal protection of the laws.‖47
Reaching
backwards in time, this new language, won at tremendous cost, reflects
national recognition that a fundamental constitutional value had not made it
into the original Bill of Rights. In crafting the Reconstruction amendments,
43
44
45

AMAR, supra note 41, at 450.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856) (link).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; supra note 42 and accompanying text; accord AMAR, supra note 41, at

450.
46
47

See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (remarks of Senator Jacob Howard).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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the Republicans intended to codify this recognition by placing basic racial
and ethnic equality at the very heart of the reformed Constitution.
Indeed, the determination to root out racial discrimination went well
beyond the simple promise of equal protection of the laws, and included
efforts to weaken or destroy social institutions that perpetuated white
supremacy in the South. The Fourteenth Amendment‘s Privileges or
Immunities Clause took aim at a host of slavery codes that tightly
controlled the exercise of religion among blacks. 48 Aware that much
religious teaching denounced slavery as immoral, and fearful that religious
meetings could become engines of slave revolt, many southern states had
enacted laws to closely monitor religious exercise. 49 And, beyond
suppressing religiously inspired resistance, the slave codes actively
employed religion to help enforce, if not justify, the worst kinds of racial
discrimination.50 Kurt Lash has pointed out that, ―[e]ven when a religious
gathering received the state‘s imprimatur, the content of the sermon was
dictated by proslavery Christian ideology with the message invariably
focused on the biblical admonition that slaves ‗obey their masters.‘‖51
Writing before the Civil War, abolitionist William Goodell observed that
slaveholders often utilized religion as a tool of spiritual subjugation: ―The
claim of chattlehood extends to the soul as well as to the body, for the body
cannot be otherwise held and controlled. There is no other religious
despotism on the face of the earth so absolute, so irresponsible, so soulcrushing as this.‖52
With these practices in mind, members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress
repeatedly pointed to the abuse—indeed, the ―debauch[ment]‖—of religion
to racist ends as among the South‘s great offenses against slaves‘
independent and equal humanity.53 Thus, many of the Fourteenth
Amendment‘s drafters intended to include not just free exercise, but also

48

See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106, 1131–37 (1994) [hereinafter Lash, Exercise]; Kurt
T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle,
27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1085, 1142–45 (1995) [hereinafter Lash, Establishment].
49
See, e.g., Lash, Establishment, supra note 48, at 1137 n. 234 (citing an Alabama law that
mandated the presence of ―five respectable slave-holders‖ at any black religious meeting).
50
See Lash, Exercise, supra note 48, at 1135.
51
Id.
52
WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: ITS D ISTINCTIVE
FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES, J UDICIAL DECISIONS, AND I LLUSTRATIVE FACTS 254 (Negro
Univs. Press 1968) (1853) (quoted in Lash, Establishment, supra note 48, at 1137).
53
See Lash, Establishment, supra note 48, at 1142–43 (collecting Congressional commentary). The
quoted language is taken from Ohio Representative James Ashley‘s speech to the House in support of
the Thirteenth Amendment: ―[Slave power] has silenced every free pulpit within its control, and
debauched thousands which ought to have been independent.‖ CONG. G LOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 138
(1865) (emphasis added).
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freedom from oppressive and discriminatory religious establishments,
among the privileges and immunities guaranteed to all American citizens. 54
Additionally, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment created an entirely
new congressional power to remediate racial discrimination—a federal
intrusion into private conduct well beyond any imagined in 1789. 55
Congress quickly put this authority to work when it passed the Enforcement
Acts aimed at the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacy groups, which
had largely ignored both the Amendment and the earlier Civil Rights Act of
1866.56 The Republicans well understood that a network of private
organizations—many, like the Klan, with direct pretensions to religion—
still governed southern culture and life. To this end, the Enforcement Acts
directly targeted ―unlawful combinations‖ and ―conspiracies‖ of citizens
that might obstruct black access to legal equality. 57 Even as these Acts
proved ineffectual, the Republicans pushed through further legislation
aimed at private acts of racial discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1875
promised blacks ―full and equal enjoyment‖ of public accommodations, and
it established a five hundred dollar fine for those who failed to so provide. 58
These efforts leave little doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment‘s drafters
believed that hard-won principles of racial equality should reach deep into
American culture and life; indeed, it should temper and qualify freedoms
and associations once thought to be well beyond federal supervision.
The Republicans, of course, miscalculated the constitutional ethos of
their time. In fairly short order, Reconstruction fell by the wayside 59 and
the Supreme Court eviscerated the Fourteenth Amendment and struck down
the Civil Rights Act,60 withering the promise of racial equality on the vine.
And over the next half century, organized religion played a central role in
the emergence of an overtly racist society. 61 However, just because the
Fourteenth Amendment was an idea ahead of its time does not change the
54

See Lash, Establishment, supra note 48, at 1142–45. This same sentiment might undercut a
ministerial exception that protects acts of racial discrimination, inasmuch as such an exemption
represents some official sanction of discriminatory religious practices.
55
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
56
Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140; 1871 Enforcement Act, 17 Stat. 13. Indeed, the 1871 Act was
known colloquially as the ―Ku Klux Klan Act‖ because it directly targeted organized racial intimidation
and violence in the South. Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free At Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 90 B.U. L. REV. 255, 284–85 (2010) (link).
57
17 Stat. at 14.
58
18 Stat. 335, 336 (1875).
59
For an excellent account of the election of 1876, in which Democrats conceded the Presidency to
Rutherford B. Hayes in return for the end of Reconstruction, see ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA‘ S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 564–82 (1988).
60
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (link); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (link).
61
Many scholars have explored the connections between religion and racial discrimination (and
violence) in the years following the Civil War. For a particularly thoughtful account, see EDWARD J.
BLUM , REFORGING THE WHITE REPUBLIC: R ACE, RELIGION, AND AMERICAN NATIONALISM, 1865–1898
(2005).
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original meaning and intention of the Equal Protection Clause. As a
historical matter, Republican authors of the Clause meant to reach into
American life and impose new constitutional conditions—racial
conditions—on previously private behaviors and decisions. Among its
targets were Southern perversions of religion and religious practice and
religiously affiliated groups that helped facilitate racial oppression before
and after the war.62 Although that intention clearly did not align with the
existing ethos, our constitutional values would go through another dramatic
recalibration in the years following World War II—shifts which the next
Part briefly explores.
B. Ethos
In the late 1940s, black soldiers returning from the war against Nazism
found themselves thrust back into the racial subordination of Jim Crow and
northern sequestration. Their discontent found an outlet in the NAACP,
whose legal arm began executing a coordinated constitutional attack on the
institutions of racial discrimination. 63 These efforts came to dramatic
fruition in the Supreme Court with Brown v. Board of Education and its
progeny, which declared racial segregation illegal in most spheres of
American life.64 In 1955, the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. emerged as
the leader of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, and within a decade, a massive
civil disobedience movement engulfed the nation.65 This movement posed
profound questions for American democracy and eventually precipitated a
fundamental evolution in our constitutional ethos. By the time President
Richard Nixon reaffirmed and extended the basic tenets of the Voting
Rights Act in 1970,66 the nation had come to terms with the promise the
Radical Republicans had originally made, but not delivered, in 1868. It
took a war, an occupation, and eventually a massive social uprising, but
62

I recognize that there is a great deal of literature debating whether those who ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment intended to reach civil and social rights. Indeed, there is much controversy
about the legality of the ratification process itself. I will say only that the record reveals that the
Fourteenth Amendment is almost entirely a product of Republican political engineering, and thus I think
it is fair in this case to rely more heavily on ―drafters‘ intent‖ than on ideas about public meaning.
63
See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816, 818 (1950) (ending racial discrimination
under the Interstate Commerce Act) (link); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1948) (invalidating
racial property covenants) (link).
64
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (link). For Brown‘s progeny, see, for example, Johnson v. Virginia,
373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (per curiam) (courtrooms) (link); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 353
(1962) (per curiam) (public restaurants) (link); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), aff’g 142 F.
Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (per curiam) (municipal buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879
(1955), vac’g 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955) (per curiam) (municipal golf courses); Baltimore City v.
Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), aff’g 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (per curiam) (public beaches).
65
See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954–63,
at 143–205 (1988).
66
Richard Nixon, Statement on Signing the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 (June 22, 1970),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2553 (link).
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racial equality finally assumed a place at the very center of our
constitutional structure.67
Bruce Ackerman famously argues that three ―constitutional moments‖
dramatically reshaped our constitutional landscape over the last century and
a half.68 While Reconstruction is plainly one such moment, Ackerman
argues that two other events that were not memorialized in new
constitutional text also qualify: the New Deal revolution and the civil rights
movement. 69 These periods of dramatic political upheaval and mobilization
allowed us to adopt more highly evolved constitutional principles. They
are, in effect, significant constitutional amendments accomplished outside
of the Article V process. For Ackerman, this means that Americans have
actually lived in four distinct constitutional republics or ―regimes‖: the
Founding regime, the Reconstruction regime, the New Deal regime, and the
Civil Rights regime. 70 To complicate matters more, each of these regimes
incorporates, or synthesizes, certain salient features of its predecessors. 71
For example, the New Deal revolution fundamentally changed our ideas
about the role government can and should play in ameliorating class
disparities, but left racial injustices largely untouched. The civil rights
movement then extended these New Deal principles into the racial sphere. 72
Ackerman‘s ideas are highly sophisticated and rely, to some degree, on
each of the modalities of constitutional argument. Fundamentally,
however, his claim is about the evolution of our constitutional ethos. It is
an effort to explain how our democracy comes to reflect new conceptions of
justice without losing sight of the hard-won victories of previous
generations—all given an anachronistic amendment mechanism that no
longer provides a meaningful avenue for constitutional change. A crucial
part of this evolutionary process, however, is some codification of the
principles that motivate a constitutionally empowered social movement. 73
In the case of the Civil Rights Movement, Ackerman claims this
codification took the form of certain ―landmark statutes‖: the Civil Rights
Act, the Voting Rights Act, and the Fair Housing Act. 74 He believes that we
should now regard these statutes as part of the constitutional canon, at the
very least, and perhaps as part of the Constitution itself. Ackerman
67

In truth, probably only the most radical of the 1868 Republicans envisioned the kinds of racial
equality in the social sphere that we now associate with the Civil Rights Movement.
68
BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS];
BRUCE ACKERMAN, 3 WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (forthcoming) (on file with
author) [hereinafter REVOLUTION].
69
REVOLUTION, supra note 68; BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 99
(1998) [hereinafter TRANSFORMATIONS].
70
See FOUNDATIONS , supra note 68, at 58, 80; REVOLUTION, supra note 68.
71
REVOLUTION, supra note 68.
72
Id.
73
See FOUNDATIONS , supra note 68, at 288.
74
REVOLUTION, supra note 68.
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summarizes the change in ethos this way: ―The landmark statutes represent
a sustained commitment by the American people to root out the
institutionalized humiliation of minorities in crucial spheres of social life,
and to transform these sociological realities providing an effective guarantee
of equality in each of these spheres.‖75 In other words, the statutes make
good on the Reconstruction-era promise to aggressively promote racial
equality, even at the expense of once jealously guarded private liberties.
Historically, then, the Radical Republicans intended to place
significant racial qualifications on many previously sacrosanct rights, but
the constitutional culture initially rejected their efforts. After the New Deal,
which dramatically enlarged federal administrative machinery and
fundamentally changed our conception of government‘s role in society, the
ethical groundwork was finally laid to accept the Reconstruction challenge.
Still, it took massive civil disobedience and intense political struggle for the
Civil Rights Movement to codify racial equality as a fundamental
constitutional value. By virtue of its historical and ethical pedigrees alone,
racial equality is surely the hardest-won (and most often threatened)
American constitutional principle. It is for these reasons that we defend it
most vigilantly. When the commitment to promote racial equality comes
into conflict with other constitutional principles, it is often the other
principles that must give way. The following Part explores some doctrinal
reasons to think that this should be the case when the racial equality
principle runs up against religious freedom.
C. Doctrine
The contributors to this colloquy differ as to which constitutional
doctrine should guide our thinking about the ministerial exception. Some
believe the ―church autonomy‖ cases are the right place to start, while
others claim that Employment Division v. Smith provides the best answers.
I certainly agree that all of these cases are relevant—the autonomy cases
more so than Smith—but the most relevant doctrine for my purposes
emerges from what others may think an improbable source: the Supreme
Court‘s 1983 decision in Bob Jones University v. United States.76 In that
case, the Court confronted a direct clash between religious freedom and
racial equality, and in so doing, offered some valuable insights into the
potential hierarchy of the two principles. In deciding against the religious
institution, the Court covered some of the same historical and ethical
ground I discussed above. The Court‘s decision is thus a doctrinal
recognition of our evolving ethical commitment to racial equality, a
commitment that now places substantive constraints on existing doctrines
with which it may conflict. In this way, Bob Jones manifests precisely the
kind of intergenerational synthesis—the blending of constitutional
75
76

Id.
461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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regimes—that Ackerman describes. For these reasons, I think it is very
useful to explore Bob Jones‘s lessons with an eye towards the appropriate
substance of the ministerial exception.
The case arose out of a dispute over Bob Jones University‘s tax status.
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts any organization
operated for ―religious, charitable . . . or educational purposes‖—conditions
the University seems to satisfy twice over. 77 Beginning in 1970, however,
the Internal Revenue Service (the IRS) decided that it could ―no longer
legally justify allowing tax exempt status . . . to private schools which
practice racial discrimination.‖78 The IRS concluded that the phrase
―religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes‖ was actually shorthand
for the ―basic common law concept [of ‗charity‘],‖ which does not embrace
groups that act ―contrary to public policy.‖79 Because of the ―national
policy to discourage racial discrimination in education,‖ the IRS decided
that racially discriminatory organizations were no longer eligible for taxexempt status.80 The University, an eleemosynary institution, interpreted
the Bible as forbidding interracial dating or marriage and therefore expelled
students who engaged in or encouraged these practices. 81 When the
University received notice that the IRS would revoke its tax-exempt status,
which it had enjoyed since 1954, it filed suit in federal district court.82
The district court ruled against the IRS, based in part on the
University‘s claim that the revocation burdened their exercise of religion
and established a governmental preference for churches that promote
certain public policies.83 The Fourth Circuit reversed, and in so doing,
rejected the University‘s Free Exercise and Establishment Clause claims. 84
The circuit court applied strict scrutiny to the Free Exercise Clause claim
and concluded that the government had a compelling interest to eradicate
both public and private racial discrimination. 85 Even more interesting, the
circuit court purported to apply the Lemon test to the Establishment claim,
but actually ended up concluding that ―certain governmental interests are so
compelling that conflicting religious practices must yield in their favor‖—
even if this results in government preferentialism. 86 For the Fourth Circuit,
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I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 578.
79
Id. at 579.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 580–81.
82
Id. at 582.
83
Id.
84
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 153–55 (4th Cir. 1980) (link).
85
Id. at 153.
86
Id. at 154. The Lemon test, derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (link),
consists of three prongs: ―First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute must not
78

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/29/

204

NORT HWE ST E RN UNI VE RS IT Y LAW RE VIE W COLLO Q UY

racial discrimination, like polygamy before it, was an evil so profound that
it could find no refuge in the religion clauses. 87
The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court, reasoning that ―[o]n
occasion this Court has found certain governmental interests so compelling
as to allow even regulations prohibiting religiously based conduct.‖88 In
language worth quoting, the Court offered its reasons for concluding that
ending racial discrimination in education was such an interest: ―[T]he
government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial
discrimination in education—discrimination that prevailed, with official
approval, for the first 165 years of this Nation‘s constitutional history. That
governmental interest substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of
tax benefits places on petitioners‘ exercise of their religious beliefs.‖89 In
this conflict between religious freedom and racial discrimination, then, the
Court made it quite clear which constitutional value must triumph. Race,
given its historical and ethical lineage, is special. Other forms of
discrimination—gender, disability, and even sexual orientation—are
working their way up the hierarchy, but for now, race remains special.
There is no denying, of course, that the ministerial exception is not
concerned with racial discrimination in education. Moreover, church
autonomy in religious and constitutive decisions is certainly a more
significant constitutional concern than the comparatively minor burdens the
tax code may impose. For these reasons, the Court may well conclude that
the lessons of Bob Jones are inapposite in this context. Nonetheless, it is
also true that nothing in the historical or ethical arguments I have made is
specific to racial discrimination in education. Indeed, those arguments may
actually be more powerful in the employment context. The extended
discussion in Bob Jones regarding our national commitment to end racial
discrimination—‖[f]ew social or political issues in our history have been
more vigorously debated and more extensively ventilated‖—suggests that it
may trump even the constitutional protection of church autonomy. 90 In any
case, it gives us good reason to think that, at least in the case of racial
discrimination, the reach of the ministerial exception may be limited.
In truth, permitting the state to supervise even this limited class of
ministerial hiring decisions opens the door to some of the compelling
objections that others in this colloquy have raised. In particular, any kind of
state oversight of ministerial hiring seems to compromise the important
interests Chris Lund identifies as within the ministerial exception‘s

foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.‖ Id. at 612–13 (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
87
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164–166 (1878) (upholding a ban on polygamy)
(link).
88
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603.
89
Id. at 604 (footnote omitted).
90
Id. at 595.
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―structural‖ and ―autonomy‖ components.91 If courts are to enforce Title
VII‘s nondiscrimination provisions against religious institutions they must
necessarily impose some secular criteria, even on constitutive kinds of
hiring decisions. Likewise, court-supervised remedies will almost certainly
result in the kinds of administrative entanglements the Lemon test seems to
preclude. Nonetheless, I suggest that these encroachments on religious
freedom are necessary if we hope to uphold our newer and overriding
national commitment to end racial discrimination. In our modern hierarchy
of constitutional rights, racial equality simply ranks above religious
liberty—and the doctrinal protections afforded religious organizations
under the ministerial exception should reflect this reality.
CONCLUSION
This colloquy‘s contributors approach the ministerial exception from a
number of angles, but my approach may be the most idiosyncratic. While I
tend to agree with those who support a broad and deferential exception on
historical and structural grounds, I do not believe that we should allow
religious organizations to make employment decisions based on race. Race
has a long and controverted constitutional history, and racial equality thus
occupies a special place among our democratic traditions. Black slavery
brought us to a catastrophic civil war less than a century after the founding
of our nation, and the post-war constitutional amendments sought to
permanently end both slavery and racial discrimination. The Fourteenth
Amendment, however, was an idea ahead of its time. The federal
government simply lacked the administrative apparatus to force race
equality on an unwilling constitutional culture. But by the 1950s, the
administrative state was well entrenched, and the groundwork was laid for a
revolution in our racial ethos. That revolution came in the form of the civil
rights movement. After a century and a half of political struggle, civil war,
and civil disobedience, racial equality finally assumed its place among the
most fundamental of our constitutional values. The Court‘s decision in Bob
Jones University is doctrinal evidence that when racial equality comes into
direct conflict with religious freedom, it is the latter that must give way.
Other forms of employment discrimination are certainly undesirable, but at
this moment in our constitutional evolution, they cannot trump religious
freedom. Racial equality, however, has been the animating principle of a
fully consolidated constitutional revolution. It now imposes special
constitutional conditions on virtually every sphere of American life—
conditions from which even religious organizations are not exempt.
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See supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text.
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